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Expungement Reform in Arizona:
The Empirical Case for a Clean Slate
Sonja B. Starr*
INTRODUCTION

In the past several years, dozens of states have adopted or expanded laws
providing for expungement of some adult criminal convictions.' Several
states have recently passed groundbreaking "Clean Slate" legislation, which
makes expungement automatic for those who meet the legal requirements. 2
Arizona, currently, is one of the holdouts to this trend-it not only has no
automatic expungement law but indeed does not even allow expungement by
petition. Although Arizona has a procedure to "set aside" a conviction,3 this
procedure does not seal the record and does not give the individual the right
to refuse to disclose it.4 In this Article, I draw on my recent empirical research

*
Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to J.J. Prescott, my collaborator on the
underlying empirical research, and to all those who assisted with, funded, and helped us to
improve that research (acknowledged in detail in Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An
EmpiricalStudy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460 (2020)). Thanks to Jason Marquez, Michael McFerran,
and Claire Mena for excellent research assistance on this Article.
1.
For example, in 2018, twenty states passed bills expanding access to expungement.
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE

AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 2 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01 /Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QA5-9PMM]. Then, in 2019, "31 states and D.C. enacted no fewer than 67
bills creating, expanding, or streamlining record relief," and twenty states "authoriz[ed] diversion
programs that produce non-conviction dispositions newly eligible for record-clearing under
existing law." MARGARET LOvE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL
RECORD REFORMS IN 2019, at 10 (2020) [hereinafter LOvE & SCHLUSSEL, PATHWAYS TO

REINTEGRATION],
https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pathways-toReintegration Criminal-Record-Reforms-in-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/35MG-734Y].
2.
See CLEAN SLATE, https://cleanslateinitiative.org [https://perma.cc/WQ8Q-DGN9]; Act
of June 28, 2018, No. 402, 2018 Pa. Laws No. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. and 42 PA. CONS. STAT.) (providing a clean slate remedy for individuals with a criminal
record); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102 (West 2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425 (West 2020);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-5.4 (2020).
3.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905(A) (2020).
4.
See id. § 13-905(F); see also Parsons v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 395 P.3d 709, 712
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Russell v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 443, 449-50
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)) (finding that even if a conviction is set aside the individual must still
disclose it when asked).
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to argue that Arizona should join its sister states in offering a second chance
to people with records.
Expungement laws respond to a large and growing problem. Tens of
millions of Americans have conviction records,5 and absent expungement,
these records effectively punish them for life, long after their formal
sentences are complete. 6 Convictions trigger hundreds of collateral legal
consequences' as well as discrimination by employers,' landlords,9 lenders,
schools, and more.' 0 The resulting deprivation of economic opportunity
5.

See The Economic Impacts of the 2020 Census and Business Uses of FederalData:

HearingBefore the J Econ. Comm., 116th Cong. 12 (2019) (statement of Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt,
Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute); Sarah K.S. Shannon et
al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United
States, 1948 to 2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806 (2017) (documenting prevalence of prison and
felony records). Misdemeanor convictions are harder to quantify than felony convictions because
of the lack of available data, but they are surely more common because misdemeanors make up
the large majority of every state's criminal caseload. See Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G.
Mayson, The Scale ofMisdemeanorJustice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746 n.81 (2018).
6.
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790-91 (2012); JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL
CRIMINAL RECORD 4 (2015).
7.

See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL

CONVICTIONS: LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE
Berson, Beyond the Sentence

§§ 1:11-1:12, 2:8, 2:44, 2:75, 6:16 (2018); Sarah B.

Understanding Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT'L INST. JUST.

J. 25, 25 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/241927.pdf

[https://perma.cc/C2FM-8GF3];

see also Chin, supra note 6, at 1811-14; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization,

68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1089-94 (2015). For a useful compilation of these legal consequences,
see

National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CSG JUST.

CTR.,

https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/G9EG-L99H].
8.
NYC

See, e.g., NAN ASTONE, MICHAEL KATZ & JULIA GELATT, URB. INST., INNOVATIONS IN
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES POLICY: YOUNG MEN'S INITIATIVE 6 (2014),

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32651/413057-Innovations-in-NYCHealth-and-Human-Services-Policy-Young-s-Men-s-Initiative.PDF
[https://perma.cc/V954Y23W].
9.
THE

See, e.g., ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, PUTTING TIME LIMITS ON
PUNITIVENESS

OF

THE

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

SYSTEM

9

(2016),

https ://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/reducingpunitiveness_piehpolicymemo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQ5P-DWKF];MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR.
ON POVERTY L., WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL
RECORDS

BARRIERS

TO

FEDERALLY

SUBSIDIZED

HOUSING

1

(2015),

https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WDMD-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GV7K-GSEV].
10.
FAILURE

See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA'S
TO
FORGIVE
OR
FORGET
IN
THE
WAR
ON
CRIME
9
(2014),

https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/4alfl6cd-ec82-44f1-a093-798ee lcd7ba3/collateraldamage-america-s-failure-to-forgive-or-forget-in-the-war-on-crime-a-roadmap-to-restore-rightsand-status-after-arrest-or-conviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL3N-LHU4]; Beth Feldstein, The
Steep Price of a Clean Slate, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L. (June 20, 2019),

52:1059]
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makes it harder for people with records to rebuild their lives as productive,
law-abiding members of the community.
Expungement laws are, at least potentially, a powerful tool to address
these hurdles." They seek to provide a second chance to those who have
completed their sentences, preventing them from being permanently
relegated to a form of second-class citizenship. Yet despite the growing
momentum behind these laws, there has historically been almost no empirical
evidence about their effectiveness. That's because expungement is difficult
for researchers to study: expunged records are, by definition, secret.
Recently, along with my colleague J.J. Prescott, I completed a first-of-itskind statewide study of expungements in Michigan.' 2 We reached a datasharing agreement with several Michigan agencies and were able to obtain
access to deidentified expunged records (and comparable non-expunged
records), plus complete criminal histories and wage records on the same
individuals. Our study reached three key conclusions.
First, people who obtained expungements virtually all stayed crime-free
thereafter.1 3 Rearrest and reconviction rates were incredibly low: about 7%
and 4%, respectively, over a five-year period, and those were almost all
nonviolent misdemeanors. '4 Only 1% were convicted of any felony over the
next five years, and only 0.6% were convicted of any violent crime (including
violent misdemeanors). '5 Indeed, it appears that expungement recipients
commit fewer crimes than the average adult in Michigan (an average that
includes all those never convicted of a crime).1 6 Our data can't tell us why
these rates were so low: whether this group was very low risk to begin with
or whether expungement helped them to stay crime free. Other research
suggests both explanations are probably true. But either way, the findings
'7

&

https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/thejusticereport/the-steep-price-of-a-clean-slate
[https://perma.cc/9JFM-D68Y] ("[O]ur laws perpetuate a cycle of poverty where financially[ ]
struggling people with criminal records are stuck as second-class citizens."); Eric Westervelt
Barbara Brosher, Scrubbing the Past To Give Those with a Criminal Record a Second Chance,

NPR (Feb. 19, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/692322738/scrubbing-the-pastto-give-those-with-a-criminal-record-a-second-chance [https://perma.cc/68EJ-56WH].
11.

See, e.g., Brian M. Murray, Unstitching ScarletLetters?: ProsecutorialDiscretion and

Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2824-26 (2018); Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal
&

Record: Expungement and the CollateralProblem of Wrongfully Represented Self, 47 LAW

Soc'Y REv. 73, 74 (2013).
12. J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical
Study, 133 HARV. L. REv. 2460 (2020).
13. See id. at 2510-23.
14. Id. at 2513.
15. Id. at 2513-14.
16. See id. at 2514-15.
17. Id. at 2518-21; see also infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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help to defuse the public safety objections sometimes leveled at expungement
reforms.
Second, expungement appears to have substantially expanded recipients'
job opportunities.' 8 Within a year after expungement, average wages
increased by about 23% (after controlling for the same individuals' prior
wage trends). This increase was driven by unemployed or marginally
employed people finding stable jobs.1 9 One can debate whether this entire
gain is a causal effect of the expungement, but our data provide good reason
to think it is at least substantially so. 20 If so, expungement compares quite
favorably to other common policies (like job training) that states invest in to
expand job access, and it could be a tool for reducing racial disparities in
employment as well. 2 1
Third, the bad news is that all this good news affects only a small group:
under petition-based systems like the one we studied, very few people
actually obtain expungement. 22 Like most states, Michigan has long had
demanding eligibility requirements for expungements, so most people with
records don't qualify. 23 But even among those who did qualify under the rules
that applied during our study period, we found that only 6.5% received
expungements within five years of becoming eligible. 24 The others mainly
didn't apply at all. Based on our conversations with expungement experts, we
think many qualified people didn't know they were eligible, and others were
daunted by the extremely burdensome process required to apply.
Together, these findings argue strongly for the expansion of expungement
laws and in particular for laws that make expungement procedurally easier to
obtain-especially Clean Slate laws that automate expungement. Many states
are already moving in this direction-including Michigan, which just passed
a Clean Slate law as well as many changes loosening restrictions on the
petition-based expungement process.25 Arizona can and should join this wave
of reform.
18. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2523-43.
19. See id. at 2528.
20. See id. at 2533-43.
21. See id. at 2551-52.
22. See id. at 2486-510.
23. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621 (2020); Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2481-83;
Expungement FAQs: Adult Criminal Record FAQs, THE PAPILLON FOUND.,
https://www.papillonfoundation.org/information/expungement-faqs/#Adult CriminalRecord
[https://perma.cc/SA3T-GWF6].
24. Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2489.
25. Press Release, Gretchen Whitmer, Governor, State of Michigan, Governor Whitmer
Signs Bipartisan "Clean Slate" Criminal Justice Reform Bills Expanding Opportunities for
Expungement, Breaking Barriers to Employment and Housing Opportunities (Oct. 12, 2020),
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Arizona would have some catching up to do even to join the mainstream
of states that provide petition-based expungement processes. But here, I argue
that it should simply skip this step and move directly to an automated Clean
Slate approach. Other states began by adopting petition-based approaches,
because in the past, technological means to automate expungement didn't
exist. Now that the technology is there, there's simply no reason to put a
bureaucratic, costly process in place. Automation will save implementation
costs and make access to expungement meaningful for those who meet the
legal requirements.
In Part I of this Article, I provide basic background on expungement laws
and existing research and give an overview of the design of my research with
Professor Prescott. In Part II, I summarize the findings of our Michigan study,
and in Part III, I turn to the context of Arizona, reviewing relevant existing
law and policy and proposing reforms. In the Conclusion, I summarize the
case for reform and very briefly address some potential objections.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Expungement Policy Landscape
Criminal convictions impose significant burdens on individuals that far
outlast the completion of the sentence. 26 Convictions give rise to many socalled "collateral" legal consequences. 27 For example, hundreds of
professions in many states have occupational licensing restrictions that
exclude people with felonies, regardless of the felony's relevance. 21 Felonies
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-3 87-90499-542110--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/EG34-YB4F] (citing our research); H.B. 4980, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2020), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/publicact/htm/2020-PA-0193.htm
[https://perma.cc/MSP7-JJXF].
26. See sources cited supra note 6.
27.

See sources cited supra note 7; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS:

INCARCERATION'S

EFFECT

ON

ECONOMIC

MOBILITY

(2010),

https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts
lpdf
[https://perma.cc/736J-BNVH]; NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, RESEARCH SUPPORTS FAIR-CHANCE
POLICIES
(2016),
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Fair-Chance-Ban-the-BoxResearch.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UVQ-33EK].
28.

See CHIDI UMEZ & REBECCA PIRIUS, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, BARRIERS
EMPLOYMENT IN LICENSED OCCUPATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH

TO WORK: IMPROVING

CRIMINAL

RECORDS

2

(2018),

http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/Labor/Licensing/criminalRecordsv06_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GKS-GJUF]; Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of
CategoricalAmbiguity, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77, 87-88 (Austin Sarat
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also trigger restrictions on voting, 29 access to firearms, educational loans, and
many public benefits. 30 Beyond their legal consequences, convictions also
create lasting obstacles in private markets for jobs, housing, and education. 3
This is confirmed by considerable existing research: for example, field
experiments that find that employers are much less likely to call back
otherwise identical candidates with records.3 2
Tens of millions of Americans have records, and there are substantial
racial and socioeconomic disparities in their distribution. 33 So these effects
reduce economic mobility for those they affect and their families and are
among the drivers of race gaps in employment and other measures of well-

et al. eds., 2011); Press Release, Kauffman Found., Policy Changes Needed To Unlock
Employment and Entrepreneurial Opportunity for 100 Million Americans with Criminal Records,
Kauffman Research Shows (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.newswire.com/news/policy-changesneeded-to-unlock-employment-and-entrepreneurial-5535013
[https://perma.cc/FGB9-34LR];
Shoshana Weissmann & Nila Bala, Opinion, Criminal Justice, Occupational Licensing Reforms
Can Go Hand in Hand, HILL (Apr. 15, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civilrights/383262-criminal-justice-occupational-licensing-reforms-can-go-hand-in-hand
[https://perma.cc/C89U-KYXK].
29.

See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENT'G PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS:

ESTIMATES
OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT,
2016,
at 13 (2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LXR6-QBXT].
30. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., supra note 10, at 19; AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA
STATE-LEVEL

STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

COLLATERAL

SANCTIONS

AND

DISCRETIONARY

DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 7-13 (3d ed. 2004); PAUL SAMUELS & DEBBIE
MUKAMAL, LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY 12-16 (2004),

http://www.november.org/resources/LACReportCard.pdf

[https://perma.cc/FGV5-39ZZ];

Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 23-25 (Marc

Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating ExOffenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1204-06 (2006); Prescott & Starr, supra
note 12, at 2471.
31. See Harry J. Holzer et al., PerceivedCriminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the
Racial Hiring Practicesof Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 471 (2006); Devah Pager, The Mark
of a CriminalRecord, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 960 (2003).
32. See Pager, supra note 31, at 946-48, 958; Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box,
Criminal Records, andRacial Discrimination: A FieldExperiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191, 192-200
(2018) [hereinafter Agan & Starr, Ban the Box]; Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of
Criminal Records on Access to Employment, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560-61 (2017).
33.

See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2016,

[https://perma.cc/68J8-QFQT]
at 10 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf
(comparing imprisonment rates by race); Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of
Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 476 (2014)
(comparing arrest rates by race).

52:1059]

EXPUNGEMENT REFORMINARIZONA

1065

being. 34 These consequences have driven calls to adopt reforms that give
people with records a "second chance." 3 5 There are several strands of this
movement: for example, "Ban-the-Box" laws delay employer access to
criminal records until late in the hiring process. 36 But for people with records,
the most significant potential for relief comes from expungement laws.
Because expungement clears an individual's record, or at least seals and
negates it for most purposes, it can effectively alleviate many different
hurdles at once.
Most expungement laws do not wholly eliminate a conviction from an
individual's record for all purposes. These records usually continue to exist
in sealed form and can be used for certain narrow purposes such as law
enforcement investigations or sentencing for future crimes. However,
expungement laws typically eliminate all or almost all state-level restrictions
on employment, licensing, and benefits, and give individuals the legal right
to say "no" (with no risk of fraud liability) when an employer, landlord, or
other entity asks if they have a conviction.3 7 Employers, landlords, and the
like are typically forbidden from considering expunged convictions even if
they learn of them, and on the other hand, cannot be held liable for failing to
consider them (for example, in a negligent hiring suit).38
Expungement laws typically have stringent eligibility rules, which vary
across states. Almost all states impose a waiting period after completing the
34. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 27, at 27; Andi Mullin, Banning the Box in
Minnesota and Across the United States!, CMTY. CATALYST (Dec. 2, 2013),

https://www.communitycatalyst.org/blog/banning-the-box-in-minnesota-and-across-the-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/69C6-TBU2].
35. See sources cited supra note 1; David Brand, A CriminalJustice Reform Would Give
Thousands a Clean Slate if Only They Would Apply, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/11/25/a-criminal-justice-reform-would-give-thousandsa-clean-slate-if-only-they-would-apply/ [https://perma.cc/34H3-NDKR]; Nila Bala & Rebecca
Vallas, Opinion, State Momentum in Criminal Record Sealing Fuels Federal Clean Slate Bill,
HILL (Mar. 2, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/485477-statemomentum-in-criminal-record-sealing-fuels-federal-clean-slate-bill
[https://perma.cc/W5MNT2GB].
36.

See LINDA EVANS, ALL OF US OR NONE, BAN THE BoX IN EMPLOYMENT: A GRASSROOTS

HISTORY 8 (2016), http://criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BTB-emp-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LAU-NPUA]; BETH AVERY & HAN LU, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, BAN THE
Box: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES TO ADVANCE
EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITIES

FOR

PEOPLE

WITH

PAST

CONVICTIONS

(2020),

https :/s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-GuideOct-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7LE-HDDP].
37. THE PAPILLON FOUND., supra note 23.
38. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a)(1) (West 2020) (prohibiting employment
discrimination); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12952 (West 2020) (prohibiting disclosure). In Michigan, it
is a misdemeanor to rely on or divulge the existence of an expunged conviction. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 780.623(5) (2020).
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sentence (or sometimes after the conviction), during which the individual
must stay crime-free. 39 States also sometimes exclude certain types of
crimes, 40 limit expungement to comparatively minor crimes, or limit the
number of convictions that the individual can have. 4 ' For example, during the
time period covered by our Michigan study, state law extended expungement
to first-time offenders with a single conviction only, after five clean years. 42
Sex offenses, traffic offenses, and the most serious class of felonies are
excluded. 43 Many states, including Michigan, are now adopting laws making
these restrictions somewhat less stringent. 44
The latest wave of expungement legislation, referred to by the label "Clean
Slate," makes expungement automatic in some cases. 45 This is a substantial
change in the typical expungement model, in which individuals who qualify
must apply to a court, often by completing quite onerous petition procedures,
and the court has the discretion to decline expungement. 46 The Clean Slate
approach, in contrast, was exemplified by landmark legislation in
Pennsylvania in 2018, where it was passed by a near-unanimous, Republicandominated legislature (demonstrating a growing bipartisan consensus in
favor of expungement laws). 47 Similar laws have recently passed in other
See 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & OtherRecord Relief, RESTORATION
RTS.
PROJECT,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-statecomparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside
[https://perma.cc/4FTN-LP74]
(Oct.
39.

OF

2020).
40.
41.

§ 15A-145.5 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 18(A)(11) (2020).
See RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, supra note 39; Compare States, CLEAN SLATE

E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.

&

CLEARINGHOUSE, https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/compare-states
[https://perma.cc/94VUUPRD]; Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2472-76 (describing this legal landscape in more
detail).
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(3) (2011).
43. Id. § 780.621(2).
44. See sources cited supra note 25 (describing new Michigan legislation); LOVE
SCHLUSSEL, PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION, supra note 1 (reviewing new legislation passed in
2019).
45. See CLEAN SLATE, supra note 2.
46. See RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT, supra note 39; Simone Ispa-Landa, Believing in a
Positive Future as a Form ofStigma Resistance: NarrativesofDenied Expungement-Seekers, 40
DEVIANT BEHAV. 1428, 1435 (2019); LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION, supra

note 1, at 14.
47. See Act of June 28, 2018, No. 402, 2018 Pa. Laws No. 56 (codified in scattered sections
of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. and 42 PA. CONS. STAT.); Press Release, Tom Wolf, Governor, State of
Pennsylvania, Governor Wolf: "My Clean Slate" Program Introduced To Help Navigate New
Law (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.governor.pa.gov/newsroom/governor-wolf-my-clean-slateprogram-introduced-to-help-navigate-new-law
[https://perma.cc/ENF7-UDRE];
Frequently
Asked Questions About Clean Slate, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA. (June 26, 2018),
https://clsphila.org/employment/frequently-asked-questions-about-clean-slate/
[https://perma.cc/3PY5-U3CM]; J.D. Prose, PennsylvaniaBecomes FirstState with 'CleanSlate'
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states, including South Dakota, Utah, California, New Jersey, and
Michigan. 4 8
Under the Clean Slate approach, computer algorithms use state criminal
history databases to identify those who meet the legal requirements for
expungement, and (while actual implementation procedures vary by state)
there would be no petitions and no judicial discretion. All states that have
followed this approach so far have left petition-based processes in place
simultaneously, because automatic relief is available only to a subset of those
who may petition for expungement, and/or only after a longer waiting period.
For example, Pennsylvania's Clean Slate bill applies only to nonviolent
misdemeanors; 49 California's is more ambitious but still excludes felonies
resulting in jail time. 50 Michigan's is one of the farthest-reaching of the new
Clean Slate bills, applying even to many serious felonies; however, it has a
ten-year waiting period for felonies and a seven-year waiting period for
misdemeanors, 5 ' while petition-based expungement will now require a threeyear wait for some misdemeanors and five years for other crimes.52

B. Our Expungement Research
The research project that I carried out with Professor Prescott sought to
fill a major gap in existing knowledge about the effects of expungement laws.
Despite the enormous legislative momentum surrounding such laws and their
potential importance, they have been subject to troublingly little empirical
analysis. Prior to our study, there was no published research on "uptake" of
Law for Nonviolent Criminal Records, BEAVER CNTY. TIMES (June 28, 2018, 5:00 PM),
https://www.timesonline.com/news/20180628/pennsylvania-becomes-first-state-with-cleanslate-law-for-nonviolent-criminal-records [https://perma.cc/BB64-H5DV].
48. See S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 23A-3-34 (2020); Jessica Miller, Utah Lawmakers Pass the
'Clean Slate' Bill To Automatically Clear the Criminal Records of People Who Earn an
Expungement, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/03/14/utahlawmakers-pass-clean [https://perma.cc/HVV7-VFE6]; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102 (West
2020); CCRC Staff, CaliforniaBecomes Third State To Adopt "Clean Slate" Record Relief,
COLLATERAL

CONSEQUENCES

RES.

CTR.

(Oct.

10,

2019),

https://ccresourcecenter.org/2019/10/10/california-becomes-third-state-to-adopt-clean-slaterecord-relief [https://perma.cc/8U5C-XSRJ];CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425 (West 2020); Press
Release, Phil Murphy, Governor, State of New Jersey, Governor Murphy Signs Major Criminal
Justice
Reform
Legislation
(Dec.
18,
2019),
https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562019/approved/20191218a.shtml
[https://perma.cc/V5YE-RK8F]; N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:52-5.4 (2020); sources cited supra note 25
(describing new Michigan legislation).
49. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2 (2020).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425 (West 2020).
51. Press Release, Gretchen Whitmer, supra note 25.
52. H.B. 4983, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020).
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expungement opportunities,5 3 nor on recidivism rates of those receiving
expungements. The available work on employment outcomes was very
limited, with the leading paper being a small study of 235 individuals who
applied for expungements or other post-conviction relief through a particular
law clinic.5
Why has there been so little work on expungement? The main challenge
has been lack of access to data: obviously, expunged records are generally
unavailable, and employment and wage records are also private. Luckily, we
were able to overcome these problems via a data-sharing agreement with the
State of Michigan, allowing a large-scale statewide study. 5 We received
complete criminal histories from the Michigan State Police as well as
Unemployment Insurance Agency wage records on hundreds of thousands of
individuals. The state performed the matching of records across these
agencies and then deidentified the data before turning them over to us.
Our dataset includes everyone who received an expungement in Michigan
through March 2014 (close to 30,000 people), as well as a much larger group
of similar individuals who did not receive expungements. Our study discusses
our dataset (and some limitations, which are relatively minor) in detail. 56
Note that in Michigan, expungements are called "set-asides," a point that
potentially raises confusion for an Arizona audience, given that in Arizona
the same term is used to refer to a lesser form of post-conviction relief. "Setasides" in Michigan entail the sealing of records and allow the recipient to
proceed for most purposes (such as job applications) as though the record did
not exist, while also eliminating most collateral legal consequences. I use the
term "expungement" here to refer to this procedure, to avoid the confusion.

II.

OUR FINDINGS

Here, I briefly summarize our study's findings on the three major
empirical questions it addressed. First, Section A documents the problem of
low expungement "uptake," i.e., the low rate at which eligible people actually
obtain expungements. Section B presents our findings on post-expungement

53. But see Colleen V. Chien et al., The Washington State Second Chance Expungement
Gap
1
(Feb.
28,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529777 [https://perma.cc/WNY4-SPNR]
(presenting brief, preliminary findings of a new study that also showed very low expungement
uptake).
54. See Jeffrey Selbin et al., Unmarked? Criminal Record Clearing and Employment
Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33, 38-40 (2018).
55. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2483.
56. Id. at 2483-86.
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crime rates, which were very low. And Section C shows that expungement
recipients made impressive gains in wages and employment rates.

A. Low Uptake of Expungement Opportunities
The first question our study addressed was expungement "uptake." 5 The
uptake rate is the percentage of legally eligible individuals who receive an
expungement over a given period of time. We found that this rate was low:
about 6.5% of those who met the requirements actually got expungements
within five years of becoming eligible. 58 Because expungement denials by
judges are fairly rare (Michigan judges grant about 75% of applications they
receive), 59 this implies that over 90% of eligible individuals did not even
apply. 60
To reach this conclusion, we first identified a sample cohort of nearly
10,000 legally eligible individuals. 6' All had one conviction for an
expungement-eligible crime on a single criminal count, were sentenced
between January 1999 and May 2001, and were not reconvicted within five
years. 62 None were sentenced to incarceration, which would have
complicated our assessment of subsequent outcomes. 63 These individuals first
qualified for expungement between 2004 and 2006, and we tracked them for
five subsequent years. 64
Obtaining this number did require some judgment calls, in particular in
defining the sample of those legally eligible for expungements, which
constitutes the denominator in the uptake rate. So how confident can we be
that the 6.5% estimate is correct? It could be slightly off because of data
limitations, but we tested the effect of using a range of different assumptions
about the information we were missing (for example, out-of-state and federal
convictions, as well as certain date fields that some observations didn't
have). 65
None of these alternative assumptions changed our result much, and
therefore, we are quite confident that we are within a percentage point or two
of the correct uptake rate. Also, we know from our broader dataset that most
57. See id. at 2486-510.
58. Id. at 2489-90.
59. Id. at 2483.
60. Id. at 2489.
61. Id. at 2490.
62. Id. at 2488.
63. In incarceration cases, the eligibility clock runs from release, and we do not have the
release dates.
64. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2488 n.141.
65. See id. at 2488-93.
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people who get expungements get them within five years; we project a
lifetime expungement rate of less than 12%.66 And uptake appears to be even
lower for people who have been incarcerated. Among all expungement
recipients, only 29% had faced any prison or jail time, and only 2% had been
incarcerated for more than one year.6 7 So, because our uptake estimate
focuses only on people who were not incarcerated, it probably overstates the
true overall uptake rate among all those eligible.
Notably, the 6.5% rate is within the subset of people who legally qualify
for expungement. But legal eligibility for expungement is narrow in
Michigan, like in other states. 68 Thus, the very low uptake rate is itself just a
small fraction of a small fraction. 69
The uptake gap may seem surprising. After all, as discussed above,
criminal records place substantial burdens on individuals. One might think
that anyone who is eligible to free themselves of this burden would do so
eagerly. Yet few do-why? 7 0
Our quantitative data don't directly answer that question, so we
supplemented our data with a qualitative analysis. We interviewed a number
of Michigan's leading lawyers and advocates who work on expungement and
reentry issues. 7 ' They gave us a consistent set of explanations, which
increases our confidence that the explanations are correct.
The first problem is lack of information: many eligible individuals either
do not know that the expungement law even exists or do not know that they
qualify. 72 And few have counsel to advise them. 73 Beyond this problem,
66. Id. at 2493.
67. Id. at 2494.
68. See, e.g., id. at 2481-83; Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Legal Aid Law. (Feb.
22, 2019); Telephone Interview with Miriam Aukerman, Senior Staff Att'y, ACLU of Mich. (Feb.
16, 2019); E-mail from Josh Hoe, Co-Chair, Pol'y & Educ. Comm., Nation Outside, to author
(Feb. 13, 2019, 12:25 PM) (on file with author); see also sources cited supra note 2.
69. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2509-10.
70. See id. at 2501-10.
71. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Legal Aid Law., supra note 68; Telephone
Interview with Miriam Aukerman, supra note 68; Telephone Interview with Tracey Brame,
Assoc. Dean, Cooley L. Sch. (Mar. 11, 2019) (on file with author); E-mail from Josh Hoe, supra
note 68; Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, Att'y, Mich. Legal Help (Feb. 14, 2019);
Telephone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, Deputy Dir. of Workforce Dev., City of
Detroit (Feb. 27, 2019); E-mail from John Shea, Att'y, Private Prac., to author (Feb. 15, 2019,
1:33 PM) (on file with author); E-mail from Kim Thomas, Clinical Professor of L., Univ. of Mich.
L. Sch., to J.J. Prescott, Professor of L., Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. (Feb. 17, 2019, 9:19 PM) (on file
with author).
72. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2502.
73. Id. at 2505-06; see, e.g., MARGARET (PEGGY) STEVENSON, EXPUNGEMENT: A GATEWAY
TO WORK 1-2 (2015), http://cucsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Stevenson-ClearinghouseArticle-April-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EWZ-YBQD].
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though, even if one is aware of one's eligibility, it is not easy to pursue an
expungement. There are a lot of bureaucratic hoops to jump through. 74 The
State of Michigan's website includes eleven detailed steps to pursue,
including at least two trips to a courthouse (including for a hearing) and one
trip to a police station (to get fingerprinted). 75 Forms must be notarized in
quadruplicate and mailed off to exactly the right address. 76 A certified record
of conviction must be obtained.77 The cost of all this totals around $10078
quite a bit for those who are economically struggling, and that does not
include the cost of transportation, childcare, and/or time off from work to get
everything done. 79
All this is especially daunting for people with records whose past
experiences with the criminal justice system have overwhelmingly been very
negative. 80 These individuals, now five years or more clear of those negative
experiences, often have a very aversive reaction to the idea of reengaging
with the system, and they also tend to have limited resources to pay expenses
and overcome the administrative hurdles.8
In light of these problems, low uptake rates should not be so surprising
after all. Researchers have found similarly low uptake rates in other contexts
involving access to legal processes or applications for other valuable
benefits.1 2 Very low uptake rates tend to be found whenever seeking relief
requires jumping through hoops-such as paying onerous application fees or
navigating difficult or complex procedural requirements-or whenever
awareness of the opportunity is relatively low.83 As this literature suggests, a
right or opportunity that is too costly to exercise is effectively worthless.8 4
74.

See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2502.

75.

See

MICH.

CTS.,

MC

227:

APPLICATION

TO

SET

ASIDE

CONVICTION

2,

&

https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Forms/courtforms/mc227.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EYV6-YJVF].
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 71.
79. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2504.
80. See id. at 2504-05.
81. See E-mail from Josh Hoe, supra note 68; Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne,
supra note 71.
82. Colleen V. Chien, The Second Chance Gap, 119 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript
at
12),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265335
[https://perma.cc/98T3-AJVP]; UGGEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 13; Maximilian A. Bulinski
J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and

Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 217-35 (2016); J.J. Prescott, Assessing Access-to-Justice
Outreach Strategies, 174 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 38 (2018).
83. Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2501-06; see Chien, supra note 82 (manuscript at
17-23).
84. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2477-78.
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There have been some recent efforts by nonprofits, 85 and even by the
Detroit city government, 86 to try to close the uptake gap through legal
services.8 7 Although these efforts are helpful, they can't possibly close an
uptake gap of the enormous size we found. The only thing that will do so is
automating expungement, as several states have now done. 88 By eliminating
bureaucracy, this process makes expungement much less resource-intensive
for the individual and the state. This is a commonsense improvement: once a
person has met the legal requirements for expungement, there is simply no
reason to make the process an ordeal.

B. Low Recidivism Ratesfor Expungement Recipients
The main objections raised by opponents of expungement reforms usually
relate to public safety. Opponents suggest that members of the public,
including employers, landlords, and the like, have a right to know who has a
criminal record so that they can best protect themselves from those
individuals' potential future crimes.89
This argument has two implicit assumptions. First, it assumes that people
with expunged records pose a crime risk (beyond the small crime risk that
anybody poses). Second, it implies that expungement expands that risk-or,
put another way, that the public nature of criminal records promotes safety
by allowing protective steps to be taken. Expungement opponents do not cite
empirical support for these assumptions, and no study does support them. 90

85. See Do-It-Yourself Expungement (Adult Conviction), MICH. LEGAL HELP,
https://michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/crime-traffic-and-id/do-it-yourself-expungementadult-conviction [https://perma.cc/5X47-88VN]; Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne,
supra note 71; see also Have You Been Convicted of a Crime?, MICH. WORKS! SE.,

https://www.mwse.org/expungement [https://perma.cc/U4B7-SJCW]; Telephone Interview with
Chioke Mose-Telesford, supra note 71.
86. See Project Clean Slate, CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/departments/lawdepartment/project-clean-slate [https://perma.cc/ZJQ2-E4LY].
87. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2507-09.
88. See id. at 2464-65.
89.

See, e.g., Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent

Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 361, 375 (2016)
(describing this argument); Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449, 499, 455 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (stating that "employers are generally entitled to know about the past convictions of job
applicants" such that expungements should only be granted in "extraordinary circumstances");
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND

(2006),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/agbgchecksreport.pdf
CHECKS
1
[https://perma.cc/4BY8-WT8M] (stating that employers do background checks "to protect
employees, customers, vulnerable persons, and business assets" and avoid negligent-hiring suits).
90. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2521-23.
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Again, there is little existing research on expungement, but our data offer new
insights.
Because we have the full criminal records of all Michigan expungement
recipients, we are able to directly address the question of their subsequent
crime risk. 91 We evaluated two- and five-year rearrest and reconviction rates
for nearly 21,000 Michigan residents who received expungements (all those
for whom we had enough years of post-expungement outcome data). 92
We find that these rates are very low. For example, in the five years after
expungement, just 4.2% were reconvicted of any crime. 93 Of these, the great
majority were only convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors 94 (the most
common of which were traffic misdemeanors 95). Only 0.6% were convicted
of a violent crime, and only 1% were convicted of any type of felony. 96 Rates
were similarly low when we looked at different subsets of the data, such as
people whose expunged conviction was a violent offense.97
These rates are not just low compared to those measured in other criminaljustice-involved populations-they are low even compared to the general
population of Michigan, that is, all adults in the state, most of whom have no
record. 98 In 2009 and 2010 combined, Michigan police made approximately
6.6 arrests per 100 adults in the population. 99 But among those receiving
expungements in those years, we see only 4.7 arrests per 100 individuals in a
two-year period.'
These findings lead to some important follow-up questions. Are these
crime rates so low because expungement helps to reduce crime? Or were
these individuals simply at very low risk to begin with? And what would
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 2511-17.
See id.
Id. at 2512-13.
See id. at 2512.
See id. at 2509-10.
Id. at 2512-14.
See id. at 2512.

98.

See David J. Harding et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of Imprisonment on Future

Felony Convictions and PrisonAdmissions, 114 PNAS 11103, 11106-07 (2017); Press Release,
Michigan Dep't of Corr., Michigan Recidivism Rate Falls to Its Lowest Level at 28.1 Percent
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-26847-459956--,00.html
[https://perma.cc/M9GJ-WKHH]; Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2514.
99.

See

MICH.

STATE

POLICE,

2009

STATE

ARREST

TOTALS

(2010),

https://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/2009AnnualStatewideArrests_332334_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TAA9-D5XV]; MICH. STATE POLICE, 2010 STATEWIDE ARREST TOTALS (2011),
https ://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/2010_Annual_StatewideArrests_358704_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HDB-CWKA]. Population figures come from the 2010 Census. QuickFacts:
Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/MI/POP010210
[https://perma.cc/Q7KR-UZWB].
100. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2514.
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happen to crime rates if expungement were extended to a broader and perhaps
higher-risk group?
Our data can't directly answer these questions, but we can offer some
informed speculation, drawing on a large body of existing criminological
research on the factors influencing recidivism. The short answer is that it's
likely that both explanations are true: Michigan expungement recipients were
a low-risk group to begin with, and expungement (if anything) probably
reduced that risk further. Moreover, if expungement were extended to a
higher-risk group, it would probably reduce that group's crime rates too.
There are quite a few reasons to think that the expungement recipients in
our dataset had a low baseline risk of criminal recidivism. The most important
is the waiting period: all of them had gone at least five years without a
subsequent conviction. Studies of criminal "desistance" and "redemption"
tell us that people who go that long without offending will rarely offend
again. ' The highest risk period for recidivism is in the first year or two after
conviction or release from incarceration.
In addition, this group consisted of first-time offenders with a single
conviction, further reducing risk. 0 2 And the uptake analysis discussed above
tells us that even among those meeting the waiting period and other eligibility
criteria, this was a highly selected group. These were the individuals with the
resources, motivation, and persistence that enabled them to navigate the
onerous expungement process-assets that could well be correlated with lawabiding conduct.
But while these individuals likely started out low-risk, there's also good
reason to believe that expungement made them even more so. Here again, our
interpretation is guided by the broader criminological literature on the factors

101. See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN &

KIMINORI

NAKAMURA, EXTENSION OF CURRENT

ESTIMATES OF REDEMPTION TIMES: ROBUSTNESS TESTING, OUT-OF-STATE ARRESTS, AND RACIAL

&

DIFFERENCES
40-41
(2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240100.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BD4R-4GMV]; Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the
Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 331-39 (2009);
Shawn D. Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of CriminalBackground Checks: Do Age and
Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28-30 (2011); Megan C.
Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal
Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 64, 71-78 (2007); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters
and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record PredictFuture Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY
PUB. POL'Y 483, 492-98 (2006).
102. See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION

OF

THE

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

10,

15

(2004),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2004/200405_Recidivism CriminalHistory.pdf[https://perma.cc/CMJ5-DGMC].
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that predict recidivism, including unemployment,' 0 3 low wages and
poverty, 0 4 homelessness and housing instability,1 0 5 lack of education,1 06 and
social stigma.107 Expungement should be able to reduce at least some of these
risk factors, perhaps all of them. Indeed, we document below that
expungement opens opportunities for more stable and higher-paid work. It
likely also improves access to housing, education, and other benefits. By
reducing risk factors, expungement should be expected to reduce crime.
And this expectation should also hold if we expanded access to
expungement, either by loosening eligibility requirements or by making the
process automatic. To be sure, it wouldn't be surprising to see higher crime
rates for the resulting, larger pool of recipients than we saw in the narrower,
self-selected pool. The broader pool might (depending on the eligibility
changes) extend to people with more recent, more serious, and more
extensive records, and in general these factors are associated with a higher
baseline risk of crime.1 08

103. See, e.g., CHI. MAYORAL POL'Y CAUCUS ON PRISONER REENTRY, REBUILDING LIVES.
RESTORING

HOPE.

STRENGTHENING

COMMUNITIES.

15

(2006),

https://northstarnews.com/userimages/references/Mayoral%2OPolicy%20Caucus%200n%20Pris
PAUL
[https://perma.cc/ANK5-P6AU];
oner%20Reentry.2006_City%20of%/o20Chicago.pdf
GENDREAU ET AL., CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST. STUD., CASE NEEDS REVIEW: EMPLOYMENT DOMAIN 5-

7, 12 (2000), https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/092/r90_e.pdf[https://perma.cc/P89C-L8UM];
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 40-41
(2003); JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URB. INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF

PRISONER

REENTRY

31-33

(2001),

http://research.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from-prison_tohome.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2Z6RYGR]; Nicholas Freudenberg et al., Coming Home from Jail: The Social and Health
Consequences of Community Reentry for Women, Male Adolescents, and Their Families and

Communities, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1725, 1734 (2005).
104. See Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment

Versus PunishmentEffects, 98 Q.J. ECON. 157, 163 (1983); Kristy Holtfreter et al., Poverty, State
Capital, and Recidivism Among Women Offenders, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 185, 198
(2004).
105. See Stephen Metraux & Dennis P. Culhane, Homeless Shelter Use and Reincarceration
Following PrisonRelease, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 139, 151-53 (2004).
106. See STEPHEN J. STEURER & LINDA G. SMITH, CORR. EDUC. ASS'N, EDUCATION REDUCES
CRIME:
THREE-STATE
RECIDIVISM
STUDY
20-21
(2003),

https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED478452.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7J-KHDF]; John Nuttall et
al., The Effect of Earning a GED on Recidivism Rates, 54 J. CORR. EDUC. 90, 92-94 (2003);
Kristen M. Zgoba et al., The Influence ofGED Obtainmenton Inmate Release Outcome, 35 CRIM.

JUST. & BEHAV. 375, 376-77 (2008).
107. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records:
Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 736-37 (1981);

William D. Payne, Negative Labels: Passagewaysand Prisons, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 33, 33-34
(1973); David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist

Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 305-07 (2000).
108. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2522-25, 2552.
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But by definition, this higher baseline risk of crime isn't caused by
expungement. To the contrary, extending expungement to a higher-risk group
should still be expected to reduce that group's crime rates. Indeed, if
expungement reduces crime rates, there's actually more potential public
safety upside in applying it to a group that has non-negligible crime rates to
begin with.1 09
Expungement opponents have never offered any empirical evidence for
the contrary theory that expungement undermines public safety, and the logic
underlying this theory crumbles under even a little bit of scrutiny. The idea
seems to be that knowledge provides safety: that employers and other
members of the public can learn who has a criminal record and take steps to
protect themselves." 0
But this is illogical as a strategy for protecting the public at large. Nobody
does background checks on everyone they meet, much less on every stranger
who could potentially harm them. Having a criminal record that appears in
public databases inflicts many disadvantages, but it in no way disables an
individual from committing future crimes. A background check might allow
some particular employer or landlord to avoid hiring or renting to someone
with a record. But if that person poses a crime risk, not hiring them only
displaces that risk to some other landlord or employer or to the general
public."' And if they end up jobless or homeless, that risk will only be larger.
Finally, our data speak only to expungement recipients' subsequent crime
risk. But one might imagine a concern about another crime effect: general
deterrence."1 2 Perhaps the availability of expungement could encourage
potential first-time offenders to commit crime by alleviating some of the
negative consequences of a conviction. "I
But even if this is theoretically possible, in practice it is very unlikely.
Research on general deterrence strongly indicates that potential offenders, if
they are sensitive to the consequences of getting caught at all, are at best
focused on consequences that are immediate and quite certain. "4 And the
109. See id.
110. See id. at 2522.
111. See id.; cf J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex

&

Offender Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REv. 1035, 1040, 1057 (2016) (identifying a similar pattern
among sex offenders subject to notification and registration requirements).
112. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2544-48.
113. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L.
EcON. 519, 532-36 (1996) (suggesting that the social harms of having a conviction may
contribute to deterrence).
114. See Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature,

55 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 5, 5-6, 27-28 (2017) (reviewing the literature and finding that while
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possibility of eventual expungement after a waiting period is far too
remote." 5 It is implausible that potential offenders would decide it was worth
it to risk arrest, conviction, public embarrassment, serving the applicable
sentence, and then years of collateral consequences, so long as they could
someday get an expungement if they stay crime-free throughout those years.
If anything, the people whose incentives would more likely be impacted
are those who have already served a criminal sentence but have not yet
qualified for expungement."16 For those individuals, the collateral
consequences of the conviction are ongoing, not remote, and expungement
may seem quite attractive. If potential recipients know that expungement is a
possibility after they complete a given waiting period without another crime,
it could provide a positive incentive to stay crime-free, especially as that date
approaches.
This "specific deterrence" possibility, although not tested by our data,
provides in theory another reason expungement policy could reduce crime.
And it's another good reason to worry that (as we found in our uptake
research) many qualified individuals don't actually know that expungement
is possible. It's in the public's interest to look for ways to raise their
awareness.

C. Employment GainsAfter Expungement
A key premise of the Clean Slate movement is the assumption that
expungements improve job access for people with records. But do they?
Given the existing research showing that having a record makes it harder to
get a job, the answer might seem obvious. Still, some skeptics have suggested
that expungement is too little, too late. Some argue that those with cleared
records will nonetheless not be able to escape the digital trails of their past
policing appears to deter crime, longer sentences do not); J.J. Prescott, CriminalSanctions and
&

Deterrence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 498, 508-09 (Alain Marciano

Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., 2019); Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider
the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L. REV. 113, 123 (2018); Michael Tonry, An Honest
Politician's Guide to Deterrence: Certainty, Severity,
DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME 365, 365 (Daniel S.

Celerity, and Parsimony, in 23

Nagin et al. eds., 2018); Giovanni

Mastrobuoni & David A. Rivers, CriminalDiscountFactorsand Deterrence2 (Inst. for the Study
of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 9769, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9769.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VXSLL8T].
115. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2545-47.
116. See Michael Mueller-Smith & Kevin T. Schnepel, Diversion in the Criminal Justice
System: Regression Discontinuity Evidence on Court Deferrals 3-6 (Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wpcontent/uploads/sites/283/2017/08/DiversionintheCriminal_Justice_System.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F98G-SGCH].
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convictions, which survive indefinitely on the Internet." 7 Others note that the
waiting periods are so long that expungement does not reach people during
the time that they need the most help getting a job." 8
My study with Professor Prescott provided the first large-scale empirical
examination of this question. Fortunately, we found large wage and
employment gains.11 9 It could be true that expungement isn't as effective in
improving job access as it might be if it came earlier or if the Internet did not
exist. But it still seems to make a considerable difference for many job
applicants.
To assess the effects of expungement, we didn't try to compare
expungement recipients to non-recipients; these two groups likely differ too
much in both observable and unobservable ways. Instead, we looked only at
recipients (a large, thirteen-year cohort), comparing their post-expungement
employment trends to their pre-expungement trends.120 We estimated trend
changes, effectively using each individual's past as his or her own control.121
And because these trends could also be affected by underlying changes in the
state's economy, we controlled for quarterly Michigan unemployment and
labor force participation measures.1 22
After an expungement, we saw a large, statistically significant upward turn
in the trajectories of recipients' wages and employment rates.1 23 Most of the
gain came in the first year, but it was sustained over time.1 24 Within one year
of the expungement, the probability that the individual was employed at all
(earning anything at all in the quarter) increased by a factor of 1.13.12 When
we used a less minimalistic definition of employment (earning at least $100
a week, averaged over the quarter), the probability of employment increased
by even more: a factor of 1.23.126 And average wages also went up by 23%.127
The wage increase appeared to be driven by the employment increase-that
is, by unemployed or very marginally employed people finding stable
employment.12

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2479 nn.96-97.
See id. at 2468 n.31.
See id. at 2533.
Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2524.
Id. at 2526.
Id. at 2527-33.
See id. at 2527.
Id.
Id. at 2528.
Id.
Id.
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A key question is whether the improvements we saw were a causal effect
of the expungement. There are some causal inference challenges here. The
basic problem is that the timing of expungement isn't random. People have
to be motivated to apply.1 29 And people are somewhat more likely to apply
when they have recently lost a job or experienced a substantial wage
decline. 3 0 That raises the possibility that post-expungement gains could
simply represent regression to the mean (a "bounce-back" effect).131 Or it
could represent the effect of the individual being especially motivated to get
a job: they might be applying for expungement and applying for lots of jobs
at the same time. And it could be the job applications that explain their
subsequent improvements.1 32

However, a close analysis of our data provides a couple of strong reasons
to believe that at least a substantial part of the large gains that we see are,
genuinely, the effect of the expungement. "I The first reason is the timing of
the gains. If the mean-regression or motivation stories were the main
explanation, we'd expect to see the wage and employment upturns happening
when people apply for expungements. Instead, we see those gains only when
people receive expungements, typically one to two quarters after they
apply.134
Second, there is one subgroup of applicants for whom the timing of
applications isn't correlated with a prior job or wage loss and may be as good
as random for our purposes. These are the people who apply right away, when
they first become eligible.1 35 There's a huge surge of applicants right after the
five-year waiting period expires, and a quarter of all expungements are
granted within a year of that date. This surge can only be explained by pentup demand;1 36 for these applicants, application timing clearly is shaped by an
arbitrary legal rule, not by an employment setback or a sudden change in
motivation. 137 But when we look only at these early applicants, we see
employment and wage gains that are nearly as large as we see in the full
sample.1 38

129. See id. at 2533.
130. Id. at 2533-34.
131. See id. at 2534-35. See generally Adrian G. Barnett et al., Regression to the Mean: What
It Is and How To Deal with It, 34 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 215 (2005) (explaining this concept).
132. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2534-35.
133. See id. at 2535.
134. Id. at 2535-36.
135. Id. at 2536.
136. See id. at 2496 nn.160-61, 2536-38.
137. See id. at 2539-41.
138. See id. at 2537 tbl.6.
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And those gains are very large indeed. For example, the wage gains we
attribute to expungement are five to ten times the average gains that one metaanalysis found for job training programs, a strategy that states and cities
routinely pursue for improving employment in disadvantaged groups,
including people with records.1 39 Meanwhile, job training is much more
expensive than expungement (which, under an automatic approach, could be
essentially free). 4 Expungement appears to offer a promising and costeffective way to measurably improve the employment prospects of people
with records.

III.

POTENTIAL FOR EXPUNGEMENT REFORM IN ARIZONA

Arizona is one of the few states that does not have any procedure for the
expungement or sealing of otherwise valid criminal convictions. In Section
A, I give an overview of the issues facing people with records in Arizona
specifically. In Section B, I look at the "set-aside" procedure that Arizona
does have (a lesser form of relief), as well as other relevant provisions of
Arizona law. And in Section C, I outline some alternative routes to reform
that Arizona could take (including some reform bills that have already been
introduced).

A. Life with a CriminalRecord in Arizona
A 2016 study found that about 1.9 million people in Arizona had some
form of criminal record.'' This figure includes some nonconviction
records.1 42 However, the Sentencing Project has estimated that there are over
220,000 disenfranchised individuals with felony convictions in Arizona,1 43
and the number with misdemeanor convictions is surely substantially larger,
since misdemeanors are much more common than felonies. 144 The state

139. David H. Greenberg et al., A Meta-Analysis of Government-Sponsored Training
Programs,57 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 31, 42 (2003) (reporting weighted means across studies).
140. Id. at 50 (citing an average job training cost of $6,600 per person).
141. BECKI R. GOGGINS & DENNIS A. DEBACCO, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2016: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT
15 16

tbl.1

(2018),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/25
.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9PT-A8KJ].
142. Id. at tbl.1 (explanatory notes).
143. State-by-State Data, THE SENT'G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/thefacts/#map?dataset-option=SIR [https://perma.cc/N3R2-KZBQ].
144. See MARK FLATTEN, GOLDWATER INST., CITY COURT: MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS

LEAD

TO

LIFE-LONG,

"BEYOND

HORRIFIC"

CONSEQUENCES

3

(2018),

https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/City-court-cosequences-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JFC-FTCW].
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presently has about 62,000 people behind bars in prisons, jails, immigration
detention, and juvenile facilities-a higher-than-average rate even within the
United States, which leads the world in incarceration rates.145
People with records in Arizona, as in other states, face a wide array of
collateral legal consequences. Convictions must be reported on occupational
licensing applications and can disqualify applicants from jobs ranging from
schoolteacher to pest control applicator to funeral director.1 46 A recent statute
offers some potential for relief by giving remedies to individuals
unnecessarily denied licenses, although individuals must go through a
petition process to seek this relief 4 7 In addition, convictions may keep
people out of public-sector jobs. Pursuant to a "Ban-the-Box" executive
order, public agencies may not ask applicants about criminal records until the
later stages of a job application process.1 48 But convictions can still ultimately
disqualify people from public employment as part of agencies' "moral
character" determinations. 149
Beyond employment, people with certain drug-related convictions may be
ineligible for public housing, welfare benefits, state-funded scholarships, and
tuition waivers. 0 In general, local public housing authorities have discretion
to use convictions to disqualify housing applicants, and major cities in
Arizona do so, although they are not required to do so by law (with some
crime-specific exceptions). "i In Tempe, for example, all applicants must wait
145. Arizona

Profile,

PRISON

POL'Y

INITIATIVE,

https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/AZ.html [https://perma.cc/ZW26-3Y42].
146. See FLATTEN, supra note 144, at 4; Penny L. Willrich, Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Employment in Arizona (May 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478010 [https://perma.cc/KAR2-XSEH].
147. UMEz & PIRIuS, supra note 28, at 5-6, 7.
148. Ariz.
Exec.
Order
No.
2017-07
(Nov.
6,
2017),
https://azgovernor.gov/sites/default/files/boxeo_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/22MH-SQM7]; Howard
Fischer, Ducey Announces Steps To Curb Recidivism, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2017/ 11/06/arizona-governor-doug-ducey-announces-steps-tocurb-recidivism/ [https://perma.cc/WJ6X-LQZ8].
149. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(E) (2020) (stating that the law does require an inquiry
into whether the conviction bears "a reasonable relationship to the functions of the employment").
150. Id. § 13-3418.
151. E.g., CITY OF PHx. HOuS. DEP'T, ADMISSIONS AND CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICY 28

(2020),

https://www.phoenix.gov/housingsite/Documents/2020-2021_ACOPDraft.pdf

[https://perma.cc/9SBP-EUW7];
POLICY
FOR
THE

CITY OF TUCSON, ADMISSIONS AND CONTINUED OCCUPANCY
PUBLIC
HOUSING
PROGRAM
(2019),

https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/hcd/ACOP_2019_1.pdf

[https://perma.cc/CKQ6-BNJ9]; CITY OF

TEMPE, ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM 3-21 to 3-22

(2018),
https://www.tempe.gov/home/showdocument?id=64577
[https://perma.cc/26J9FWSW]; 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(2)-(3) (2020) (describing two specific disqualifiers for current
drug use, which can be established by a recent conviction or methamphetamine production
convictions).
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at least three years after sentencing or (if applicable) after completing a prison
term before applying; if the conviction is for a violent crime, the minimum is
five years.5 2 People with records also face restrictions on jury service,' 53
commercial driver's licenses,1 4 firearm possession," and voting rights. 5 6 In
child custody proceedings, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person
convicted of certain offenses (including drug offenses) should not have sole
or joint legal custody."
Even if none of these legal restrictions existed, however, people with
records would still face substantial hurdles in private markets for jobs,
housing, education, and other services. Arizona has no private-sector "Banthe-Box" law, so employers and landlords can ask about records at any stage
of the process.158 There is little research done on employment patterns for
people with records in Arizona specifically. One Phoenix-based field
experiment found, surprisingly, no disadvantage in online job applications
for individuals with prison records, but it did find a disadvantage for inperson applications. 159 In addition, a much larger body of literature from
around the country, including field experiments, has found strong evidence
of substantial employment disadvantages for people with records even in the
online setting,1 60 and there is no particular reason to expect Arizona to be an
exception to that pattern.
152. CITY OF TEMPE, supra note 151, at 3-21 to 3-22.
153. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201(3) (2020) (stating that a juror must "[n]ever have been
convicted of a felony, unless the juror's civil rights have been restored"); id. § 13-904(A)(3)
(providing that a conviction for a felony suspends the right to serve as a juror).
154. Id. § 28-3312(A)(1) (providing that certain convictions may result in the suspension or
permanent revocation of a commercial license).
155. Id. § 13-3 101(A)(7)(b) (stating that a prohibited firearm possessor includes individuals
convicted of a felony who have not had their rights restored); Id. § 13-3101(A)(7)(d) (providing
additional firearms restrictions); see also id. § 13-910(A)-(B).
156. Id. § 13-904(A)(1); id. § 13-907 (allowing an individual with only one felony conviction
to have their civil rights automatically restored upon final discharge so long as victim restitution
is paid); see id. § 13-906 (outlining the process one must undergo to have their civil rights restored
if convicted of a felony and incarcerated).
157. Id. §§ 25-403.03 to .04.
158. Maria Polletta, Arizona Companies Can Still Ask Job Applicants About Felonies,

AZCENTRAL
(Apr.
9,
2019,
4:10
PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/stoiy/news/politics/legislature/2019/04/04/ban-box-bill-felonies-jobapplications-dies-legislature-martin-quezada/3347376002/ [https://perma.cc/AEH5-UUEA].
159. Scott H. Decker et al., Criminal Stigma, Race, and Ethnicity: The Consequences of
Imprisonmentfor Employment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 108, 115 (2015).
160. For example, in a study I co-authored, we sent over 15,000 online job applications to
employers in New York City and New Jersey. See Agan & Starr, Ban the Box, supra note 32, at
195, 200. We found that when employers asked about records on the initial application (which
not all employers did), those without records received 63% more callbacks. Id.; see also Devah
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In general, the landscape of restrictions and private market barriers facing
people with records in Arizona is roughly similar to those that exist in other
states, including Michigan, where our research took place. The case for
expungement legislation in Arizona thus is essentially the same as the case in
any state. Arizona is an outlier only insofar as its current law provides no
procedure for expungement at all.161

B. ExistingMeans of Relieffor People with Records in Arizona
Arizona's main existing remedy for those with otherwise valid criminal
convictions (i.e., those not subject to vacatur due to appellate reversal or the
like) is the "set-aside" procedure, which allows a court in its discretion to set
aside a conviction after the completion of the sentence. 6 2 Unlike "set-asides"
in Michigan, Arizona set-asides do not result in the record being sealed or
removed from any databases, and they do not entitle the individual to answer
"no" when asked about the record as part of an application process.1 63 Instead,
this is essentially a legal rights restoration procedure; set-asides eliminate "all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction."1 64 In other words,
they eliminate the legal consequences of the record but not the other social
and economic consequences. And indeed, they do not really eliminate "all"
of the legal consequences; as in other states, the record still carries some
consequences, including being counted in subsequent prosecutions.1 65 Note
that Arizona has a separate provision for restoration of "civil rights," but this
relief is even more limited than that offered by set-asides.1 66
Even the modest remedy of the set-aside is subject to limitations. Setasides do not apply to "dangerous" offenses, for example, which are those
involving dangerous weapons or instruments (anything capable of causing
serious injury) or intentionally or knowingly inflicting serious injury.1 67 Sex
offenses, crimes against children, and many traffic offenses are also
Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage:Barriersto Employment Facing Young Black and White
Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 195, 199-201 (2009)

(finding disadvantages to people with records in an in-person field experiment).
161. See § 13-905.
162. See id. § 13-905(F).
163. See id.; Parsons v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 395 P.3d 709, 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
164. § 13-905(D).
165. Id. § 13-905(E).
166. "Civil rights" are defined in title 13, section 904(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes to
include voting, holding public office, jury service, firearms possession, and restriction of civil
liberties as is necessary during incarceration for institutional security. Restoration of these rights
other than firearms possession is automatic for first offenders but requires an application for other
offenders. See id. §§ 13-907, -908.
167. See id. §§ 13-907(K), -105.
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excluded.1 68 The individual must apply to the court for the relief, victims have
a right to notice and to be heard, and the court appears to have unlimited
discretion to decline, although the statute spells out a non-exhaustive list of
factors to consider and requires the court to state its reasons for declining.1 69
There is no application fee.l'?
A number of bills have been put forth during the 2020 legislative session
to expand the existing set-aside law, offer the possibility of expungement,
and/or limit the effects of collateral legal consequences.171 However, the
progress of those bills was hampered both by procedural requirements and
the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Arizona Capitol Times, a "silent
death" came for nearly two-thirds of the bills and legislation introduced after
failing to be heard in their chambers prior to the February 21 deadline. 7 2
Additionally, on May 7, 2020, the Senate announced that it would adjourn
the 2020 legislative session sine die. 173 So the pending reforms are now dead,
at least until and unless they are reintroduced in the future.
'4

C. PossibleReforms for Expungement in Arizona
The policy case for expungement is strong. Arizona could adopt several
different strategies that would move it in line with most of its sister states in
offering petition-based expungement, or (better) into the vanguard of states
offering automatic expungement. Here, I outline two possibilities: an
automated expungement reform or a petition-based procedure, which could
build on the existing set-aside procedure. These could readily be combined:
automatic expungement could be available for some class of cases meeting
certain eligibility requirements and a waiting period, while expungement
could be petition-based for a broader class over which it is thought to be
important to maintain judicial discretion.

168. Id. § 13-905(K).
169. See id. § 13-905.
170. See id. § 13-905(B).
171. See H.R. 2178, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020); H.R. 2708, 54th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2020); S.B. 1619, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020); S.B. 1620, 54th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020); S.B. 1621, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020).
172. Ariz. Capitol Times Staff, Fate ofMost 2020 Bills Met at Legislature 's Deadline, ARIZ.
CAPITOL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/02/28/fate-of-most-2020bills-met-at-legislatures-deadline/ [https://perma.cc/CFN9-GA5K].
173. Jeremy Duda, UPDATED: Senate Plans To End 2020 Legislative Session Friday, House
Will Not, AZMIRROR (May 7, 2020, 9:39 PM), https://www.azmirror.com/2020/05/07/senate[https://perma.cc/NDS8will-end-2020-legislative-session-friday-house-plans-unknown/
M3H8].
174. Id.
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"Clean Slate" Approach (Automatic Expungement)

The best approach for Arizona to take would be to adopt an automatic
expungement policy, analogous to those that several states have adopted
recently. Our research on uptake rates, as well as other research on uptake in
other postconviction contexts, has a clear implication: petition-based
procedures will dramatically reduce access to expungement. Moreover,
petition-based procedures are more resource-intensive for the state and for
applicants.
Petition-based procedures are a relic of an era in which criminal records
predominantly existed in paper form, or at least could not be readily analyzed
by computer algorithm. But today it is technologically possible to automate
the expungement process.1 7 5 Doing so may require an initial investment to
develop the algorithm to identify eligible cases and clear records, especially
if it requires coordination across multiple different databases. But once the
system is in place, the marginal cost of expungements should fall to
essentially nothing.
An automatic expungement procedure can have any set of substantive
eligibility requirements and waiting periods, and the states at the forefront of
the Clean Slate movement have modeled a variety of approaches. The first
two states, Pennsylvania and Utah, were quite conservative, automatically
clearing only nonviolent misdemeanors, after waiting periods ranging up to
ten years.1 7 6 California, on the other hand, extends Clean Slate relief to
felonies so long as they did not result in a prison sentence and has only a oneyear waiting period.177 Michigan's new law extends automatic expungement
to felonies with up to a ten-year maximum sentence, but as noted above, it
does so only after ten years,1 78 while the wait for misdemeanors is seven
years.
In my view, while understandable for the states first experimenting with
the Clean Slate approach, it is a mistake to be overly conservative in defining
eligibility requirements and waiting periods. California and Michigan, with
more ambitious approaches, offer better models than the very cautious
175. See Angie Jackson, It May Become Easier To Clear Criminal History in Michigan,

DETROIT
FREE
PRESS
(Sept.
20,
2019,
7:30
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/09/20/michigan-automaticexpungement-laws-record-sealed/2266703001/ [https://perma.cc/3B5T-G3G6].
176. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 9122

PM),

(2020); see also RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT,

RIGHTS
&
RECORD
RELIEF
(2020),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/pennsylvania-restoration-of-rights-pardonexpungement-sealing-2/#III Expungement sealingotherrecordrelief [https://perma.cc/T37PLK5B]; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-102, -114 (West 2020).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425 (West 2020).
178. Jackson, supra note 175.
PENNSYLVANIA

RESTORATION

OF
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Pennsylvania and Utah bills (even though those states deserve credit for being
Clean Slate's pioneers), and future states could readily go farther. After all,
as discussed above, there is every reason to believe that expanding
expungement will help public safety by giving people access to jobs and
housing.1 79 The goal shouldn't be to limit expungement only to people who
are already at very low risk of recidivism; rather, policymakers should seek
to improve outcomes for those who do pose some risk.
Long waiting periods, like most of those described above, reduce these
potential benefits because individuals won't get relief until long after the
period when they typically need it the most in order to successfully
reintegrate into society.1 80 Limiting expungement to misdemeanors also has
disadvantages; most employers only ask applicants about felony convictions,
and felonies are the trigger for most collateral consequences.181 So individuals
with felony convictions stand to gain much more from expungement-which,
again, can benefit society as well.
Still, suppose policymakers are committed to the idea that those receiving
expungement need to have already proven themselves low risk with a period
of good behavior. Having some waiting period does have advantages,
including creating an incentive for good behavior during that period. But how
long should the wait be? Our research in Michigan makes it clear that five
years is enough. 82 (We couldn't evaluate periods less than five years, since
that was the waiting period under Michigan law during our study period.183)
In every subsample within our data-including individuals with felonies and
individuals with violent-offense convictions-recidivism rates were lower
than average crime rates in the general adult population of Michigan.' 8 4 And
recidivism rates for those who received expungements after five years (that
is, shortly after becoming eligible) were not substantially lower than the rates
for those who received expungements after ten or more years.' 85 Waiting
longer than five years does not do much to affect recidivism rates; it merely
imposes a gratuitous cost on those awaiting relief.

179. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2523-43.
180. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 131; Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 107, at 739; Selbin et
al., supra note 54, at 52.
181. See UMEz & PIRrUS, supra note 28, at 3.
182. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2494.
183. Id. at 2515.
184. Id. at 2514.
185. Id. at 2512.
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Adding Record-Sealing to the Existing Set-Aside Procedure

Short of adopting a Clean Slate law, or perhaps in addition, an easy change
Arizona could make would be to amend its current set-aside law such that
set-aside records would be sealed and removed from all searchable databases.
The law should also specify that set-aside records cannot be used in
employment, housing, and educational access decisions and that an applicant
can treat a set-aside record as though it does not exist for those purposes. And
the law should require that all commercial vendors of criminal background
information remove set-aside convictions, and continued access of those
vendors to state records should be conditioned on their compliance. (All these
provisions should be included in any automated expungement law as well.)
These amendments would effectively transform the set-aside procedure
into something close to expungement (analogous to the procedure labeled
"set-aside" in Michigan), instead of simply a restoration of legal rights. With
these reforms, set-asides might be able to offer recipients improved access to
private employment and other markets, analogous to the large employment
gains we saw in Michigan.
If Arizona were to take this approach, it could adopt some new set of
eligibility constraints. Analogously, some reform bills introduced during the
2020 legislative session would have created new expungement procedures
with their own sets of rules.1 86 In my view, though, the simpler and better
approach would be to maintain the current procedures and substantive
eligibility requirements that presently apply to set-asides. Those eligibility
requirements are not especially demanding, and there is no fixed waiting
period. But while formal eligibility hurdles are necessary for a Clean Slate
automated approach, they are really not necessary for a petition-based
procedure. Judges have, and would retain, the discretion to reject set-aside
applications that in their view come too soon, or that otherwise do not appear
to be in the public interest. And certain offense classes that might be deemed
inappropriate for sealing (like sex offenses subject to registration) are already
excluded from set-asides.18 7
Our Michigan study strongly suggests that even if record-clearing were
added to the set-aside law, applications would probably not be very
common.' 88 This is why the Clean Slate approach is more likely to be
effective. That said, if Arizona does stick to a petition-based procedure, it
186. See H.R. 2893, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020) (proposing to create a new recordsealing procedure with varying waiting periods depending on the type and extent of the criminal
record); H.R. 2882, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020) (proposing a new procedure for the
complete destruction of records, with various constraints based on crime type).
187. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905(K) (2020).
188. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 12, at 2492-93.
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could help to reduce the uptake gap by offering funding for public defenders
and other court-appointed counsel to assist with petitions, and by training
defense counsel to treat pursuing these petitions as a core part of indigent
defense work. It should also seek to streamline procedures as much as
possible. For example, petitions should regularly be able to be granted
without hearings on the basis of online applications, especially where there
is no objection from the prosecutor or victims. Arizona should certainly
maintain one positive feature of its current system: a lack of an application
fee, since even small fees are highly burdensome to those in poverty.

CONCLUSION

Providing a second chance to people with records isn't just in their interest.
It is in society's interest to encourage successful reintegration into society, to
discourage recidivism, to get more people working and paying taxes, and to
help the families of those affected. Michigan's experience provides empirical
evidence that policymakers in Arizona and elsewhere can draw on. It shows
that crime and employment outcomes for those with expungements are very
positive. And it makes the case for removing the bureaucratic barriers that
otherwise impede access to expungement and using the approach that
technology now makes possible: automating relief for those who meet the
legal requirements.
Although this short piece does not afford space to discuss every detail
related to expungement policy, I will briefly touch on a couple of potential
objections not already addressed above. First, the Clean Slate movement is
not calling for eliminating responsibility or justice for crimes. In states that
offer expungement, it's only available to people who have served their
sentences-and often to people who have gone well beyond that, also
demonstrating rehabilitation through years of further law-abiding conduct.
For the penalty for every crime to last forever is inconsistent with theories of
moral desert and, indeed, with all major theories of punishment.
Second, some might object that expungement conceals information that
the public has a right to know. But this begs the question: what information
about individuals should we consider public? The answer can't be everything
that employers or other members of the public might be interested in. After
all, we treat a great deal of individual information (even information about
the individual's interaction with the state and others) as private: tax records,
unemployment insurance records, health records, education records, and the
like. We certainly don't have the state maintain such records in publicly
searchable databases or allow the state to sell it to commercial databases
effectively extending the state's punishment of the individual. Perhaps it is
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time to start thinking of an old, fully discharged criminal record as the kind
of information for which, eventually, an individual's interest in privacy
begins to outweigh the public's interest in information-especially given that
the stakes for that individual are high.
Arizona is, today, an outlier state in its lack of any expungement policy.
For the hundreds of thousands of Arizonans with convictions, it is hard,
regardless of years or decades of effort, to move beyond the shadow of their
past mistakes. The Clean Slate idea offers the possibility of redemption and
serves society's interests as well, including making the public safer. With
reforms, Arizona can move from the back of the pack to the front, offering
moral leadership that is backed up by hard data.
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